Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship by Goldsmith, Jack & Vermeule, Adrian
Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship
Jack Goldsmitht
Adrian Vermeuletf
In The Rules of Inference' ("Rules"), Lee Epstein and Gary King
argue that all empirical and causal assertions in all legal scholarship-
including doctrinal, normative, and interpretive scholarship that as-
serts subsidiary empirical and causal claims-should follow a unitary
approach to inference, one that is grounded in the logic of statistics.
From that premise, they advance a sweeping indictment of legal schol-
arship and its supporting institutions, claiming that every article in
their large data pool violates at least one rule of inference and urging
a radical reorientation of legal education.
At some level of generality, it is hard to disagree with the spirit of
Epstein and King's complaints. Scholarship generally, not only in law
or political science, should ground its empirical assertions in war-
ranted inferences from sound evidence, should admit to causal and
empirical uncertainty where it exists, should avoid tendentiousness
and selection bias, and should follow the best statistical practices when
making statistical claims. Lawyers and judges, and indeed educated
people generally, would benefit from a basic knowledge of statistical
methods. Putting aside the opportunity costs of statistical training (an
issue to which we return below), greater attention to the rules of in-
ference would, when appropriate, improve legal scholarship.
We nonetheless reject much of Epstein and King's indictment of
legal scholarship. We begin in Part I by identifying a broad domain of
legal scholarship for which the rules of inference lack obvious rele-
vance. As is unsurprising for outsiders, Epstein and King overlook that
legal scholarship frequently pursues doctrinal, interpretive, and nor-
mative purposes rather than empirical ones. Legal scholars often are
just playing a different game than the empiricists play, which means
that no amount of insistence on the empiricists' rules can indict legal
scholarship-any more than strict adherence to the rules of baseball
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supports an indictment of cricket. Epstein and King miss this point
because their empirical methodology blinds them to legal scholar-
ship's internal perspective. Epstein and King's external perspective-if
valid-might cause legal scholars to see their practices in a new and
interesting light. But in many domains of legal scholarship, it provides
no basis for persuading insiders to accept Epstein and King's meth-
odological counsels.
Having narrowed the field of potential relevance, we next ques-
tion the privileged status of Epstein and King's rules of inference even
within political science, much less in other domains. Epstein and King
give the impression that their article extends uncontroversial methods
from political science to law. In fact, as we show in Part II, Epstein and
King's prescriptions are contested even in their own discipline. There
simply are not "Rules of Inference" in the sense of universally agreed-
upon methods of empirical analysis.
Even granting the relevance and legitimacy of the rules of infer-
ence, Part III contains a pragmatic critique of Epstein and King's pre-
scriptions. If empirical research were costless, Epstein and King's pre-
scriptions would be sensible. But given constraints on time, informa-
tion, expertise, and research funds, academics face inevitable tradeoffs
between rigor and accuracy, on the one hand, and timeliness, rele-
vance, and utility, on the other. This tradeoff is especially pointed for
disciplines that, like law, are professionally and practically involved in
the business of courts and other governmental institutions that must
constantly reach decisions despite profound empirical uncertainty. A
warning sign for Epstein and King is that their own article contains a
host of embedded empirical and causal assertions that violate the
rules of inference. This fact is significant not because it exposes Ep-
stein and King as inconsistent or hypocritical, but because it under-
scores that scholarship must necessarily proceed on the basis of un-
proven empirical assumptions if it is to proceed at all.
I. RELEVANCE
Epstein and King lack a normative account of the aims of legal
scholarship, and the lack of such an account deprives them of the
normative baseline they need to ground their criticisms. The reader of
Epstein and King's 133-page article will find almost nothing that
speaks to the simple question, "What is legal scholarship for?" Much
of the time Epstein and King implicitly assume that legal scholarship
ought to relate to the legal system in the same way that political sci-
ence or government departments relate to the political system gener-
ally. On this view, legal scholars are, at present, just political scientists
who (1) study a limited subset of political institutions, namely those
that produce and enforce legal rules, and (2) lack the empirical and
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methodological tools that real political scientists possess. The needed
reforms will improve the legal academy's methodological skills, while
leaving the legal academy confined to its present substantive domain.
Legal scholars should be junior-varsity political scientists-and, as we
discuss in the next Part, political scientists of a particularly narrow
stripe.
But there is an entirely different picture of the aims of legal
scholarship. In a large domain, it is not true that legal scholars try to
do just what political scientists do, only less successfully. Often, legal
scholars try to do other things entirely, and at least sometimes do them
rather well. Those other things include making doctrinal, interpretive,
and normative arguments.4 The legal academy supplies vocational
rather than scientific training; law schools usually produce lawyers, not
graduate students; and legal scholars often write in the lawyer's style
rather than in the empiricist's because they are participants in, not just
students of, the legal system's practices.
The substance of much legal scholarship is doctrinal, interpretive,
and normative. Subgenres in this category include articles and books
that attempt to reconcile or distinguish lines of precedent displaying
internal tensions; that provide conceptual analysis of the internal logic
of statutes, cases, and other materials; and that provide novel readings
of canonical legal sources. The best legal scholarship combines these
features, fitting confused canonical materials together in a coherent
way and presenting the materials in a normatively attractive light.
Work in this vein contains no empirical claims in any important or
contestable sense-at least not if "contestable" is defined by reference
to the internal consensus of legal academics. As we discuss below, any
scholarly community presupposes some degree of consensus on
shared premises, empirical and otherwise.
Doctrinal, interpretive, and normative legal scholarship seeks to
persuade, which means that the lawyer's style is often largely rhetori-
cal. Epstein and King describe lawyerly rhetoric as "political persua-
sion,"s in a tone suggesting that Epstein and King equate persuasion
with sophistry. But Epstein and King overlook that the rhetorical style
is a mixed bag of vice and virtue.6 The vice is that much legal scholar-
ship is advocacy scholarship, and therefore rhetorical in the condem-
natory sense: it is tendentious, sloppily or even deceptively reasoned,
and rests upon unsubstantiated factual claims or the sort of empirical
shibboleths that circulate in law schools (for example, that disagree-
4 There are, of course, many other aspects to legal scholarship, many of which are not
touched by Epstein and King's critique. In these short comments we focus our analysis on these
three aims.
5 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 9-10 n 23 (cited in note 1).
6 See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 73-74,517-30 (Harvard 1995).
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ment among the justices harms the Supreme Court's public standing).
The last point is, as we have said, the kernel of truth in Epstein and
King's position.
But there is a sense in which "rhetorical" need not be a term of
condemnation. Rhetoric is often a more effective tool of persuasion
than is, for example, regression analysis, because successful rhetoric is
accessible, vivid, and mixes positive, interpretive, and normative claims
in richly textured ways. Good legal scholarship is effective precisely
because it displays these rhetorical traits. At its best, persuasive legal
scholarship displays a power to elucidate the logic of doctrinal prac-
tices in enlightening ways, to engage audiences, and to motivate legal
and social change-a power usually lacking in the pallid output of sta-
tistical empiricism.
Epstein and King briefly nod to some of these points in a buried
footnote,7 but the rest of their article shows that they have failed to in-
ternalize their implications.They say that persuasion and advocacy are
appropriate to the courtroom, but that "the faculty commons" is a
place in which "the truth, and not just a particular version of it, mat-
ters." In Part II we question their equation of valid inference with sta-
tistical inference. But even on its own terms, Epstein and King's com-
plaint elides a critical possibility: the contest of "particular versions" of
truth ventilated by legal articles that are tendentious when taken
separately may, at the systemic level, produce increasingly accurate
approximations of truth, as scholar-advocates criticize the work of op-
posing camps. That possibility transposes the standard justification for
the adversary system from the courtroom to the faculty commons, col-
lapsing one of the loadbearing walls in Epstein and King's construct.
The point here is not to defend an adversarial picture of legal
scholarship. The point is that Epstein and King's distinction rests on
the same fallacy as the simplistic complaint that the adversarial system
of adjudication, as opposed to the inquisitorial system, distorts facts.
True, lawyers in the courtroom shade facts and law to accord with
their desired outcomes. But it is possible, and indeed, for better or
worse, it is the premise of our litigation system, that the aggregate ef-
fect of individual *tendentiousness is a fully rounded picture of the
truth. The same aggregate effect may hold for tendentious legal schol-
arship. In both the academic and courtroom settings, there is a system-
level justification for the competitive production of evidence that Ep-
stein and King's simple critique assumes away.
The consequence of Epstein and King's failure to appreciate the
doctrinal, interpretive, and normative cast of much legal scholarship is
7 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 9-10 n 23 (cited in note 1).
8 Id at 10.
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that an air of unreality, of Martian anthropology, hovers over the arti-
cle. Amar and Widawsky famously argued that the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits privately initiated child abuse as a form of
"slavery [or] involuntary servitude."9 Epstein and King say that the
Amar/Widawsky theory "surely ... lends itself to several testable pre-
dictions" and "observable implications"; 'o for example, they claim that
"if the term 'slavery' is broad enough to cover child abuse, then we
might expect to find traces of that sentiment in the historical, legisla-
tive, and judicial records."' There is a misstep here, akin to the small
but jarring mistakes that speakers of a second language constantly
commit: Amar is a textualist, not an originalist per se, and would
probably think such evidence about the specific intent of contempo-
raneous actors marginally relevant to the task of developing a coher-
ent account of the text's implicit structure and deep commitments.
But the larger gaffe is to think that works like Amar and Wi-
dawsky's are making "empirical" claims in any sense recognizable to
political scientists. The claim that "child abuse is slavery" is not a
statement of fact like "Hyde Park is in Chicago." It is an interpretive
and normative program-legal actors should count child abuse as
slavery for purposes of enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment-
presented in the form of an arresting metaphor. Legal scholarship
sometimes deploys such metaphors to disrupt the audience's assump-
tions, in the hopes of presenting old practices in a new light and
thereby stirring reform. This is an example of the socially productive
power of rhetoric to reorient perceptions. After the Amar/Widawsky
article, we notice, even if we choose to reject, uncomfortable analogies
between practices that previously seemed unconnected.
In a similar vein, Epstein and King seemingly assume throughout
that statements such as "the Framers thought X" are testable claims of
fact that might at least in principle be quantified by counting quota-
tions in Farrand or in the ratification debates. More often in legal lit-
erature, though, such claims should be taken as shorthand for complex
interpretive accounts of sources that have attained canonical status
within the legal culture. Epstein and King's failure to recognize this
point commits them, no doubt unwittingly, to a narrow and controver-
sial version of specific-intention originalism, one now widely dis-
avowed by most originalist academics,'2 and causes them to equate na-
ively canonical and noncanonical sources. On Epstein and King's
9 Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv L Rev 1359 (1992).
10 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 73 (cited in note 1).
11 Id.
12 See, for example, Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrisbna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L J 541,552 & n 35 (1994).
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methods, a statement by James Madison counts for no more than a
statement by other signers of the Constitution, including such un-
knowns as Gunning Bedford of Delaware, Richard Dobbs Spaight
from North Carolina, or William Few of Georgia." The difference be-
tween Madison and the unknowns is the sort of soft cultural variable
that the external perspective finds it especially difficult to appreciate.
For a final and somewhat more complicated example, consider
the empirical controversy over whether the death penalty has a deter-
rent effect. Legal scholars continue to cite Isaac Ehrlich's famous but
methodologically suspect study; Epstein and King use this as an ex-
ample of "the staying power of flawed and discredited legal studies."
As good empiricists, however, Epstein and King should ask them-
selves whether there is an explanation (other than tendentiousness or
stupidity) for legal scholars' persistence in invoking Ehrlich's work.
Dan Kahan, for example, argues that legal scholars use the language
of deterrence in the hope that it will present an appearance of neutral-
ity and dampen intractable conflict over the philosophy of punish-
ment." On this view, it is no more important that the relevant studies
are inaccurate or outdated than it is important to a lawyer that the
phrase "hung jury" is an archaic and obscure metaphor.
But it may be asking too much of external observers, not situated
within and saturated by the debates internal to the legal discourse
about capital punishment, to imagine even such an explanation. Our
point here is not to endorse tendentious distortions of fact. Our point
is simply to call into question Epstein and King's resolutely externalist
approach to legal scholarship; the Martian anthropologist may end up
being a worse, rather than better, empiricist, because the Martian an-
thropologist's inability to participate in and identify empathetically
with the practice of legal discourse may radically contract the range of
hypotheses that seem plausible candidates for testing. That possibility
is central to a long-running methodological debate in anthropology,
political science, and many other disciplines, between scholars of Ep-
stein and King's externalist stripe, on the one hand, and hermeneutic
or interpretive social theorists, on the other. The interpretive camp ar-
gues that empiricists must become, to the extent possible, participants
who interpret cultural practices from the inside.16 By assuming away
the interpretivists' view at the outset, Epstein and King commit them-
13 See US Const signatories.
14 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 17 n 42 (cited in note 1).
15 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413 (1999).
16 See, for example, Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Social Science (Westview 1991); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures
(Basic 1973).
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selves to controversial assumptions that narrow the audience for, and
the relevance of, their supposedly technical critique.
II. THE RULES OF INFERENCE?
This points to a different critique of Rules. Epstein and King
complain that legal scholarship displays "little awareness of, much less
compliance with, the rules of inference that guide empirical research
in the social and natural sciences."'17 A reader of Rules uninformed of
longstanding methodological debates in social sciences might be for-
given for thinking that there is a single, uncontroversial approach to
inference across disciplines that is essentially statistical. Rules not only
assumes away the possibility of normative and interpretive political
and social theory, but also, even within the non-interpretive camp, as-
sumes the hotly contested proposition that statistical methods of in-
ference apply equally to large-number empirical claims, on the one
hand, and qualitative case-study work, on the other.
This assumption requires an extended defense not provided here
by Epstein and King, for there is a vigorous contemporary debate
about the value of statistical approaches to inference in small-number
case studies. We cannot do better here than to point the reader to
criticisms of the statistical approach, advanced in the highly respected
peer-reviewed journals that Epstein and King praise, by political sci-
entists with impressive methodological credentials. '8 The essential
point of this critique is that the statistical worldview does not translate
cleanly to the single (or small-number) case study, where a detailed
contextual analysis can often uncover causal and other explanatory
mechanisms that statistical correlation cannot capture.
For similar reasons, proponents of the statistical approach find it
puzzling that certain cases receive disproportionate attention, both in
political science and in law, because those cases have attained canoni-
cal status in the relevant academic community, or have become focal
points around which academic communities organize their debates.
Epstein and King have a tin ear for this phenomenon, as their critique
of Sklansky's work on the Fourth Amendment shows.19 Sklansky
claims that the Supreme Court's search-and-seizure jurisprudence has
recently taken an originalist turn and supports his claim by pointing to
17 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 6 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
18 See, for example, Timothy J. McKeown, Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Re-
view of King, Keohane and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research, 53 Intl Org 161 (1999); Mark I. Lichbach, ed, Review Symposium: The Qualitative-
Quantitative Disputatiorn Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba's Designing Social
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 89 Am Polit Sci Rev 454 (1995).
19 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 32-34 (cited in note 1).
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a set of prominent recent cases. ° Epstein and King complain that
Sklansky examines only eleven of the fifty-four cases the Court de-
cided in the relevant period, and demand that he demonstrate that his
sample fairly represents the whole set.2' But that complaint is about as
impressive as questioning the empirical importance of substantive due
process on the ground that the Court has sustained such claims in only
a few areas-abortion, contraception, and similar contexts-while re-
jecting it in many others. The legal and cultural salience of Roe v
Wade2 far outruns its statistical significance.
A similar shortcoming of Epstein and King's worldview is appar-
ent in their insistence on a statistical approach to history. There are
many examples of this in Rules. Consider their criticism of Fisher's ar-
ticle on the rise of plea bargaining.2 Epstein and King charge Fisher
with failing to demonstrate what his detailed case study of plea bar-
gaining in one tier of a Massachusetts county's judicial system reveals
about the rise of plea bargaining in America. Just as in political sci-
ence, where case studies can be valuable because they uncover previ-
ously unknown chains of causation, 2 so too the weaving of an interest-
ing and coherent narrative in one jurisdiction can reveal previously
unknown patterns or explanations in broader contexts. Presumably,
Fisher could have made thin observations about many jurisdictions,
but instead he chose to make thick observations about one. The only
reason for rejecting the latter strategy out of hand is that Epstein and
King want to remake all other disciplines in the image of large-
number statistical empiricism. Epstein and King's statistical approach
to history would startle historians trained in their discipline's qualita-
tive and narrative approach to inference.
III. TRADEOFFS
We turn, finally, to a pragmatic critique of Epstein and King's
project. Epstein and King's indictment of legal scholarship is
comprehensive and severe. They claim that "every single [law review
article they read] violates at least one of the rules" of inference.2 They
appear to conclude that all such legal scholarship is illegitimate and-
because it may affect public policy-pernicious." The problem is that
20 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum L Rev 1739,
1745-74 (2000).
21 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 3,32 (cited in note 1).
22 410 US 113 (1973).
2 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 Yale L J 857 (2000).
24 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 101-02 (cited in note 1).
25 See McKeown, 53 Intl Org at 174 (cited in note 18).
26 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 17 (cited in note 1).
27 See, for example, id ("Since [ ] every single [article analyzed has] the potential to find
[its] way into a court case, an administrative proceeding, or a legislative hearing, we can only
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the same indictment can be made of Rules itself. Throughout Rules,
Epstein and King frequently make or assume a variety of causal or
descriptive empirical claims that violate the very rules of inference
that they urge the legal community to embrace. This is important not
because it evinces inconsistency or hypocrisy on their part. Rather, it is
important because it demonstrates a fundamental constraint of schol-
arship that Epstein and King discount-namely, the tradeoff between
(certain conceptions of) accuracy and rigor, on the one hand, and
timeliness and relevance, on the other.
Consider Epstein and King's astounding claim that legal scholar-
ship is not a social enterprise, and that legal scholars do not view it as
a social enterprise.s Epstein and King mention three "telltale signs of
[legal scholars'] disinterest" in the social aspects of scholarship-
nonadherence to Epstein and King's strict criteria for replication of
research, the relative lack of coauthored scholarship, and the relative
absence of peer-reviewed law journals." How does one assess these
claims? Epstein and King might simply believe that scholarship as a
social enterprise is scholarship characterized by these three character-
istics. But this would make their claim an uninteresting definitional
stop, leaving them open to the rejoinder that legal scholars define so-
ciability differently.
The more charitable interpretation is that Epstein and King are
making a causal empirical claim. They appear to believe that legal
scholars do not take seriously the social aspects of scholarship-
engaging the work of other scholars, building on it, criticizing it, work-
ing through problems together-because they do not attend to replica-
tion standards, do not coauthor, and do not publish in peer-edited
journals. Or perhaps they are making the opposite causal claim: legal
scholars do not engage in these three practices because they believe
scholarship should proceed in isolation. It does not matter which way
the purported causality runs, for Epstein and King do not provide a
shred of empirical evidence for either causal claim. Moreover, in the
course of making the claims, Epstein and King commit a host of sins
they decry. They certainly have not done what they insist legal scholars
do-namely, "maximiz[ing] their vulnerability" by considering "rival
hypotheses" for the practices they bemoan." They fail to consider
other indicia of scholarly sociability- workshops, co-teaching, draft-
swapping, written and oral comments, lunch conversations, symposia,
etc., all of which are in our experience more present in law schools
imagine the serious consequences for public policy (not to mention for the development of
knowledge) that may have already resulted-or still may result.").
28 Id at 45.
29 Id at 45-49.
30 Id at 76.
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than in political science departments.3 ' And they read evidence of so-
ciability in legal scholarship uncharitably when they assert-again,
without the attention to the rules of inference that they claim is so
crucial-that extravagant footnoting and lengthy "thank you" foot-
notes are evidence of the flabbiness, rather than the sociability, of legal
scholarship.32 Why is coauthoring evidence of sociability, while thank-
ing colleagues for comments is not?
Moreover, Epstein and King never consider why lawyers commit-
ted to legal scholarship as a social enterprise might with good reason
avoid the institutional practices that Epstein and King praise. For ex-
ample, while there is much to be said for peer-reviewed journals, there
are reasons not to favor them as well. One has to do with the lengthy
delay-sometimes years-between writing and publication that in-
heres in a peer-review system. Whatever value the peer-review system
brings thus must be traded off against the costs of untimeliness and
delay. It is just such costs that have led physicists -scholars who un-
doubtedly share Epstein and King's commitment to statistical
method-to jettison the ex ante peer review system for all purposes
but tenure review, and instead to publish their work online for imme-
diate circulation, letting the market sort out quality ex post.33
Peer review systems also raise the concern that senior scholars
favor like-minded scholarship and choke off the channels of intellec-
tual change and development. Indeed, over one hundred political sci-
entists, many of them leaders in their subfields, recently signed a letter
complaining that the editorial board of the American Political Science
Review (the discipline's "flagship" publication ) is dominated by
scholars "intensely focused on technical methods at the expense of the
great, substantive political questions that actually intrigue" many po-
litical scientists.3' This letter went on to state that "[i]t is very unfortu-
nate that deeply committed political scientists genuinely believe,
whether rightly or wrongly, that they cannot criticize the status quo
safely without the cloak of anonymity."36 The concerns raised by these
political scientists have special salience in a discipline that, like law,
31 Even if we are wrong in this conjecture, Epstein and King should have, by their own
criteria, considered and rejected these and other possible "telltale signs" of sociability in legal
scholarship before making such a pointed claim.
32 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 45,127 (cited in note 1).
33 See E-Print Archive, available online at <xxx.lanl.gov> (visited Nov 19,2001).vwe thank
Kate Kraus for bringing this practice to our attention.
34 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 45 (cited in note 1).
35 See Rogers M. Smith, et al, An Open Letter to the APSA Leadership and Members, 33
PS: Polit Sci and Polit 735, 735 (Dec 2000). For another complaint about this trend in political
science, see Jonathan Cohn, Irrational Exuberance: When Did Political Science Forget about Poli-
tics?, New Republic 25,31 (Oct 25,1999).
36 Rogers M. Smith, et al, 33 PS: Polit Sci and Polit at 736 (cited in note 35).
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lacks a general consensus about the means and ends of scholarship,
and that is ideologically charged. These concerns are attenuated in a
publication system that is, as in law, decentralized and not dominated
by scholars with particular commitments and agendas.
Rules is filled with many other empirical whoppers and inferen-
tial bloopers, including: the flatly erroneous claim that there is not a
single "law review article[ ] devoted to improving, understanding, ex-
plicating, or adapting the rules of inference"; the assertion that legal
scholars do not cite relevant literatures (a claim at odds with their
complaint about lawyers' string citations, and, more importantly, one
supported, contrary to their principles, only by a string citation and a
few examples that reek of selection bias); the unsubstantiated, ques-
tion-begging, and much-criticized claim within political science that
"[o]ther fields seem to benefit from devoting sustained attention to
their methodological problems";39 and the amusing but groundless as-
sertion that attention to the rules of inference will increase legal
scholars' readership. There are many other examples.
Epstein and King might respond by claiming that their criticisms
of legal scholarship are not made at this level of empirical detail. We
doubt this is true, but it is impossible to tell from Rules. The problems
begin with Epstein and King's description of their "supplemental"
data set of "empirical articles from six top law reviews.'' We have no
idea whether "empirical articles" include articles with the word "em-
pirical" in the title (the criterion for the initial data set), or articles
that are "empirical" in the sense that they include any "evidence about
the world based on observation or experience." 2 Setting aside prob-
lems in the description of the data pool, Epstein and King "do not
tabulate the particular types of mistakes" they identified, do not code
their data (because it was too hard to do), and "summarize [their] sur-
vey ... without explicit references."43 These are unfortunate omissions
in an article that stresses over and over again that "[r]esearch must be
replicable."" As Epstein and King insist: "[A]nother researcher should
be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce the research
37 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 11 (cited in note 1). To take one of many
counterexamples of which Epstein and King appear ignorant, see George L. Priest and Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984), which argues that set-
tlement effects make the pool of litigated cases an unrepresentative sample of legal issues.
38 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 57 (cited in note 1).
39 Id at 18.
40 See id at 59.
41 Id at 16.
42 Id at 2.
43 Idat 15&n36.
44 See, for example, id at 38.
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without any additional information from the author."4 And yet Ep-
stein and King provide no way for other scholars to assess their claims
about the sorry methodological shape of legal scholarship. They do
not, for example, "explain why they marshal particular pieces of evi-
dence and neglect others," thereby making it impossible to "repro-
duce [their study] without talking to the authors."47 This is not to sug-
gest that we question their methodological rigor; they have extraordi-
nary reputations as rigorous empirical scientists. But Epstein and King
vehemently warn that "appeal-to-authority ... is wholly irrelevant to
valid inference.""
We do not believe that Epstein and King's violations of their own
rules demonstrate the invalidity of these rules. Rather, we point out
these violations for three reasons. First, doing so demonstrates that in
any work of scholarship, some empirical claims must be taken as given
so that others can be questioned. In the normal science of day-to-day
scholarly work, an intellectual community necessarily indulges innu-
merable shared assumptions-including shared empirical assump-
tions-that do not require empirical demonstration. Of course, schol-
arship sometimes questions these assumptions, and sometimes an ex-
ternal perspective can help shine light on empirical premises that are
unwarranted. But the incessant demand for empirical confirmation
reveals incomprehension of the assumptions demanded by the inter-
nal perspective of any practice.
Second, Epstein and King's violations of their rules of inference
show that scholarship can be valuable even when it contains problem-
atic empirical assertions. To repeat a point we made in the introduc-
tion: we believe that there is much valuable criticism of legal scholar-
ship in Rules. And we have no doubt that the article will have a bene-
ficial influence on legal scholarship, both in introducing some lawyers
to the rules of inference, and in sparking a healthy debate. The point
here is that Rules is not rendered valueless because it contains many
unfounded empirical claims. The same, we think, is true of the legal
scholarship that Epstein and King criticize."
Third, and most importantly, Epstein and King's violations of
their own rules illuminate important practical constraints on scholar-
ship that they ignore. Because of limited resources (in terms of time,
research funds, information, expertise, etc.), there is a tradeoff be-
45 Id.
46 Id at 8 n 21.
47 Id at 39.
48 Id at 34.
49 In this connection, it is perhaps worth noting that Rules never demonstrates that the
empirical errors discovered in legal articles completely diminish the value of the articles' argu-
ments.
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tween accuracy, on the one hand, and timeliness and relevance, on the
other. Each department in a university resolves these tradeoffs differ-
ently depending on the nature of the discipline, its customs, and, im-
portantly, the demand for the discipline's scholarly output from out-
side institutions. One reason (but not the only one) why legal scholars
sometimes trade accuracy for relevance and timeliness is their close
connections to governmental institutions, especially courts, that have
to make decisions in the short term under conditions of empirical un-
certainty.
Consider Epstein and King's example of the fallacious jury stud-
ies that the Supreme Court cited in a 1973 decision holding that six-
person juries satisfy the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of jury trials
in civil cases.! What Epstein and King overlook is that there was a
case to be decided that turned on whether the outputs of six- and
twelve-person juries were similar. The three studies they criticize were
presumably done in anticipation of this decision. One consequence of
Epstein and King's prescriptions is that these studies should not have
been published. This means that, in Epstein and King's world, the Su-
preme Court would have been forced to decide the issue without any
scholarly data whatsoever. This is a situation that governmental actors
face all the time. They must decide an issue now in the absence of em-
pirical studies that satisfy Epstein and King's rules.
Epstein and King seem committed to the view that such decisions
are better made on the basis of no empirical studies than on the basis
of sometimes flawed empirical studies. But Epstein and King have
done none of the work that, on their own terms, is needed to support
such a drastic public-policy prescription. Any such prescription is
questionable on both the case level and the systemic level. On the case
level, courts might prefer to navigate with an inaccurate map than
with no map at all. On the systemic level, legal scholarship produces
timely but sometimes methodologically unsophisticated studies, some
of which are accurate and some of which are not. A universal insis-
tence on Epstein and King's version of methodological rigor might re-
quire making all studies less timely, thereby eliminating studies that
are both timely and accurate. Epstein and King have not shown that
the costs of methodological perfectionism are worth incurring in the
public-policy realm.
Epstein and King try to sidestep this point by advancing propos-
als for restructuring the legal academy that would facilitate more
timely and accurate empirical studies. But since their proposals do
nothing to increase the resources available to the legal academy, the
proposals simply transpose the tradeoff to the institutional level. Le-
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gal scholars who spend years studying econometrics and statistics and
generating data sets are legal scholars who have foregone training in
clerkships and law firms and who enter teaching and scholarship at an
older age, having read fewer law cases. To be sure, recent years have
seen an increasing (but still small) number of empirically trained
scholars enter the legal academy. But it is simultaneously parochial
and imperialistic for Epstein and King to assert, without demonstra-
tion according to the rules of inference, that the opportunity costs of
methodological training are identical in both law schools and Ph.D.
programs in political science.
CONCLUSION
One motivation for Rules and similar political science work criti-
cal of legal scholarship appears to be concern about the lack of influ-
ence of pertinent political science work on legal scholarship." Al-
though we have not amassed the data needed to assess this claim (nor,
by the way, have the political scientists who assert it), '2 we believe it is
misplaced. Political science literature related to voting, apportionment,
redistricting, political parties, the budget process, and legislatures has
had an enormous impact in the legal world. 3 Leading theories of legal
interpretation have been heavily influenced by political science work
in social choice and positive political theory. ' The same is true of the
work of many leading constitutional theorists.' And various interna-
tional relations theories from political science have had an enormous
impact on international law scholarship during the past decade. 1
In short, political science appears to be enjoying great success in
the legal academy. A large part of this success is no doubt attributable
to insights garnered by political science's distinctive methodological
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approaches. It does not follow, however, that the legal academy should
embrace Epstein and King's normative prescriptions. Political scien-
tists' influence has and will continue to come naturally-not whole-
sale, through the imperial command of the "Rules of Inference," but
rather piecemeal, through the intellectual leakage across disciplinary
boundaries of ideas that lawyers find persuasive.

